

Church and Society

Ordering Ethics of Catholic Social Teaching

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In the USA, Catholic Social Teaching is commonly called “*the church’s best kept secret*”. And, indeed, did the church’s Social Teaching on the other side of the Atlantic never enjoy the political and societal importance attributed to it in many European countries for such a long time including, and above all, Germany. Entire generations of Catholic politicians, social scientists, trade unionists and entrepreneurs were shaped by the Social Teachings of their Church in these countries, and this moulding has influenced their way of acting to a great extent. This influence can be clearly traced in the socio-economic realm where Catholic Social Teaching has contributed fundamentally to the rise of what we today – in a clear dividing line to the boundless capitalism of the Anglo-American brand – call the Social Market Economy.

Only a few names serving as examples should illustrate it here: Heinrich Brauns (1868-1939), during the German Empire as director of the *People’s Association for Catholic Germany*, considerably formed the social policy of the Weimar Republic as Minister of Labour of the Empire. Wilfried Schreiber (1904-1975), in the young Federal Republic theoretician of economics at the universities of Bonn and Cologne, who, in 1954, as advisor to the *Alliance of Catholic Entrepreneurs*, developed the concept of the dynamic pension which merged into the foundation of the Grand Reform of Pensions in 1957. After the Second World War, Oswald von Nell-Breuning SJ (1890-1991) was the decisive intermediary between the (German) unified trade union DGB and Social Catholicism and exerted a considerable influence on the union-political course by successfully working on the exclusion of the Marxist class-struggling wing around Viktor Agartz.

This small number of examples – the series could be continued easily – illustrates that Social Catholicism has not only formed the moral views of people but also made essential contributions to the political shaping of societal institutions. But this was only possible because Social Teaching never restricted itself to preaching a kind of “social morality”, i.e. simply demanding people to sport kind-heartedness in social intercourse. Catholic Social Teaching rather demanded working out socio-ethical yardsticks and principles for the design of social order.

Deciding on a course in *Rerum novarum* (1891)

Without a doubt, solidarity among people is of great importance and has been an integral part and essential feature of Christendom. Already in antiquity was active love of one’s neighbour an important cause for the attractiveness and spreading of Christendom. Upon becoming the dominant religion in the Roman Empire, the commandment of loving one’s neighbour also changed people’s living together in society.

Catholic Social Teaching, however, does not relate to these direct cultural and civilizing influences of Christendom. Social Teaching emerges only in the 19th century against the background of industrialization and the labour question. The starting point

was the insight that neither elevating Christian morality nor the traditional means of charity could meet the demands involved with it. Rather it had become necessary to also probe for the structural causes of the labour question and, starting from there, to develop institutional and, above all, political perspectives for its solution. In this sense, Pope Leo XIII (1810-1903), in the first social encyclical *Rerum novarum* (1891) appealed not only to the factory owners' responsibility to their workers, but he also analyzed the imbalance of power between the parties of the labour market as a cause for the labour question in the Age of Industrialization. Starting from there, he demanded legislature for the protection of the workers by the state and recommended to the workers to join forces for collective self-help in workers' associations and trade unions.

Leo XIII' s approach was a decision on the course to be taken. Because in the early phase of Social Catholicism, there had been mixed opinions about the proper position of the Church in view of the epoch-making demands of the labour question. One group rejected Liberalism stock and barrel, wanted to get rid of the free market again and pleaded for reshaping the entire socio-economic realm following the model of pre-modern feudal society even in the Age of Industrialization. This corporative state position was represented in the Southern Germany region and Austria, and, most prominently by Karl Freiherr von Vogelsang (1818 -1890) living in Vienna. Therefore one speaks of the "Viennese Movement" of Social Catholicism. However, the counter-movement, which eventually succeeded and served as a standard even for the encyclical *Rerum novarum*, is based on the basic acceptance of the competitive economic system and the free market, also the free labour market, but wanted to bring it under control by installing socio-political measures. The programmatic spearhead of this approach had already been formulated by the Mainz workers' bishop Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler (1811 – 1877) in an address to the Fulda bishops' conference in 1869: "As the system as a whole cannot be done away as a whole, it is important to cushion its single bad consequences, to look for respective cures, and to have the workers, as far as possible, partake of the blessings of what good there is about the system."

¹ This approach of social reform is also called the "Mönchengladbach Movement" because it was propagated by the *People's Association for Catholic Germany* from this city located in the Lower Rhineland.

Ordering Ethics

In the Mönchengladbach movement, the position of Catholic Social Teaching prevailed, namely that the conflict between labour and capital can and must be resolved by administering a policy of labour and social concerns leading to a just balance of the conflict of interests conducive to the welfare of society. And here lies not only the decisive distinction between the social-romantic ideas of Vogelsang's and other "Viennese", but, above all, to Marxism and the Socialist workers' movement. It is this balance of interest between labour and capital that Karl Marx (1818-1883) deemed impossible. To him, the paid labour relationship was structurally an indissoluble relationship of exploitation. Therefore, to him the solution to the Social Question could only lie in a revolutionary coup and the powerful push of Communism. Catholic Social Teaching, however, lays down its counter-position in the *Rerum novarum*, namely that the Social Question can be resolved through a political and legal order of economic-social processes.

This is the ethics ordering approach of the Church's Social Teaching in which society explicitly becomes the object of ethical reflection. The focus is not anymore on the moral views and the conduct of the individual but, above all, on the societal conditions, structures, rules &c which prescribe the social framework of the individual's behaviour. In modern, complex and functionally differentiated societies this social framework of behaviour is of decisive significance. Someone moving in this defined functional system can emancipate herself from the governing rules of this system only to a minor degree. In the 19th century, there were quite a number of entrepreneurs who took on their responsibility seriously by establishing company health insurance funds and mutual loan societies for their workforce. Industrialization, having introduced free competition to modern business, saw opportunities for the single factory owner as quite limited. Somebody who paid his workers considerably higher wages and offered better working hours than a less socially inclined competitor soon could not keep up with the competition for prices at some point. Therefore fundamental improvements and a pacification of the class conflict could only be achieved by changing the order of the framework such as legally limiting working time and the legal institutionalization of the tariff conflict. And with its ethics ordering approach, Catholic Social Teaching enjoys quite a considerable share in building a path followed so successfully in 20th century Europe.

This is the meaning of Social Ethics of Catholic Social Teaching being described as ordering ethics: It is about giving social processes, structures and institutions a bindingly ordered framework. Referring to the notion of order, modern Catholic Social Teaching could continue older traditions, especially the scholastic tradition of the Middle Ages in whose social conception the notion order (Lat. *ordo*) played a central role. However, scholastic understanding of order was static and holistic in accordance with the mediaeval view of the world, whereas the concept of order of Catholic Social Teaching has been regarded as dynamic right from the beginning and still is i.e. implying changeability of the social order and seeing it as a political task. This political task for shaping is expressively not directed to the sum of social processes but to the design of a framework of order. The task of this framework of order is to give the societal processes binding rules and to direct them to certain social goals (e.g. social justice, security and freedom).

In the course of this, society's realm of freedom should not be restricted but rather be ordered and, thereby, made safe. Direct interventions by the state in society's dealings in freedom can only be allowed, from the point of view of ordering ethics, where violations of rules occur or important concerns of the community cannot be addressed otherwise. This state of affairs can be compared to a football match with its binding rules of the game, the game proper making the ball roll and fly freely, now and then being interrupted by the referee when punishing foul play or correcting unruly behaviour.

Order and Freedom

In this vein, Catholic Social Announcements (almost in all cases ²) has resisted the temptation to cross the boundaries of the framework of order and wanting to determine the concrete design of social order in detail. Instead, the Church's social epistles contain only a few maxims and principles that make up the ethics ordering core of Social Teaching. In the history of social announcements, the Church has always undertaken spelling out these basic principles in view of concrete social

challenges to expose social injustices and to develop perspectives for a solution. Against this backdrop, the social ethicist Hermann Josef Wallraff has aptly described the Church's Social Teaching as a syntactic structure of open sentences.³

Ordering ethics of Catholic Social Teaching are aware of basic socio-ethical principles but does not claim to offer a blueprint for an ideal society. In other words: Ordering ethics respects society's realm of people's freedom. In a historical perspective, this statement may come as a surprise, above all in the view of pre-council Social Teaching which, up to the first half of the 20th century, was "shy with" ideas such as democracy and parliamentarianism. And in spite of this, even for this pre-council Social Teaching and, appropriately, for social announcements starting from the Second Vatican Council (1962 – 1965), it was considered that there is a liberal core inherent in the ethics ordering concept.

At first glance, 'order' seems to be a term from political rhetoric of Conservatism, but it is also central to Liberalism. The liberal watchword *rule of law*, effective since James Hannington (1611 – 1677) and John Locke (1672-1704), *the rule of law*, in contrast to *the rule of man*, the (arbitrary) rule of the individual is an ordering ethics concept. Social order and especially legal order do not manifest themselves as restrictions of freedom but rather to the contrary: they serve in safeguarding freedom. *Rule of law* means that even the government is not above the law but that the legal order must always be the yardstick of one's conduct and enjoys absolute priority over all justifications. Without a binding (legal) order, there cannot be freedom. Even more so: Order opens the playground for freedom.

Consequentially, the totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century, Soviet Communism and National Socialism, abolished not only society's freedom but also the social order by giving their regimes the style of a new form of revolutionary rule with the party, respectively the "Führer" standing above any law. In 1939, the English (and not at all Catholic) social philosopher, Michael Oakeshott (1901 – 1990) saw essentially two intellectual movements which opposed the totalitarian screws put on freedom and order: political Liberalism and Catholicism.⁴ In the ordering ethics concept, with its then neo-scholastic hue type of Social Teaching, he recognized its deeply anti-ideological and, above all, anti-totalitarian character.

Pope John Paul II (1920 -2005), second to none, again and again put emphasis on the anti-ideological impetus of Catholic Social Teaching. Only shortly before his death in 2005, did he write in his last book "that at the root of all documents of this teaching profession (on Social Teaching) rests the subject about freedom of Man."⁵ Highlighting the connection between freedom and order again and again was his deep concern.

John Paul II 's great legacy in terms of ordering ethics lies above all in his encyclical *Centesimus annus* of 1991. Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union he puts the question in this document if "after the failure of Communism, Capitalism was the victorious system of society" which could be recommended to those countries as a role model "who were seeking the path to true economic and social progress." To this his answer was: "Capitalism being labelled as an economic system acknowledging the fundamental and positive role of enterprise, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means of production, free creativity of Man in the realm of economics, the answer certainly would be positive. Perhaps it would be more

suitable to speak of an 'economy of enterprise' or 'market economy' or simply 'free economy'. 'Capitalism' understood as a system in which economic freedom is not integrated into a fixed legal order putting it in service of complete freedom of humankind and regards it as a special dimension of this freedom with its ethical and religious centre, then the answer is decisively negative" (*Centesimus annus* 42).

Orders of Value and Law

This connection of order and freedom is not only valid in the economic-social realm but also in the political arena. Democracy is no exception: True democracy is only possible in a constitutional state and the proper view of Man. (...) Democracy without values easily turns into open or clandestine totalitarianism" as proven by history (*Centesimus annus* 46).

Of course John Paul II was aware that there is a distinction between the order of values and the order of law. And experiences in the multicultural and pluralistic society teach us that there are individuals and whole groups representing (non-) values in contradiction to the common law. In these cases, law must be executed, necessarily be enforced. But this is only possible where the order of law is supported by the convictions of values shared by a large majority of society. Where the foundation of values has been eroded, respectively where non-values have spread, traditional law, on the long run, will no longer provide stability and protection. It is inescapable what the expert on constitutional law, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, often quoted, has found out: "the liberal free, secularized state – it too and especially so - lives on prerequisites it cannot guarantee itself." ⁶

Totalitarian ideologies, holistic concepts of society, secular or religious fundamentalisms threaten not only law but also these preconditions. John Paul II, who during his lifetime had to experience the reign of terror by the National Socialists in occupied Poland as well as Communist dictatorship, was very well aware of all this. What he has formulated for Christendom and Social Teaching of the Church can also serve as a litmus test for other religions and views of the world which these days demand an equal footing with the Christian churches in a liberal secular constitutional state: "The Church (...) does not turn a blind eye to the danger of fanaticism or fundamentalism of those who believe, in the name of an alleged scientific or religious ideology, to be entitled to force upon other people their opinions on what is true and good. *Christian truth* is not of this kind. Christian faith, which is no ideology, does not claim to force the colourful socio-political reality into a rigid scheme. He acknowledges that in the course of history the lives of humankind have flourished under diverse and not always perfect conditions. Therefore, part of the Church's proceedings is the constant, solemn declaration of the transcendental dignity of the individual, its respect for freedom" (*Centesimus annus* 46).

Looking, Judging, Acting

Viewing the question on how values of the Christian tradition, respectively the principles of the Church's Social Teaching, can be translated into political action it was important for Pope II to emphasize that the Church does not link its Social Teaching with a political programme. In this context, he expressively rejected the formula of a "third way": "The Church's Social Teaching is no 'third way' between liberal capitalism and Marxist collectivism and no possible alternative to other, less

distant, solutions” he wrote in his encyclical *Sollicitudo rei socialis* in 1987. “In addition, it is no ideology but an exact formulation of the results of a minute reflection on the complex realities of human existence in society and on an international level and all this in the light of faith and the Church’s traditions. Its main goal is to interpret such realities by examining if those concur with the outlines of the teaching of the Gospel about Man and his worldly and at the same time transcendent vocation or not to give the conduct of Christians orientation. Therefore, it does not belong to the realm of ideology but to theology.” (*Sollicitudo rei socialis* 41)

This citation comprises simultaneously the three steps of *Looking – Judging – Acting* which were formulated by Joseph Cardijn (1882 – 1967) as a methodological guiding principle for the work of the *Christian Workers Youth* founded by him and later adapted by the Christian social movement as a whole as well as by the Church’s Social Teaching. On the level of looking, we are talking about getting aware of society’s realities and its challenges. As emphasized by Pope John Paul II, it deals with ‘complex realities’ which essentially make Social Teaching dependent on the dialogue between the human, natural and social sciences which are capable of an exact analysis of the different realms of reality. By this preparedness for dialogue, the Church acknowledges at the same time that in this world its task is not only to teach but also to learn. On the level of judging, the socio-ethical reflection of the social realities grasped beforehand takes place. Here the basic Christian values and principles of order cherished by Social Teaching come out to bear.

How these basic values and principles are to be realised in concrete terms in the social order is decided on the level of political acting. The Church’s Social Teaching being no political ideology and not wishing to engage in a social-technical structuring of society, it cannot provide binding answers on this level but only offer orientation as is stated in the citation from *Sollicitudo rei socialis*. In a way, the Church’s Social Teaching sets up ethical guard rails between which the room for freedom and respect for the democratic struggle about different options of political acting are kept. Whereas the social announcements of the teaching profession exercise self-restraint, individual Christians and social associations of the Church, respectively other Christian groupings, can of course take a strong stand in a political struggle just like any other citizen and, above all, political parties.

The Church’s Social Teaching clearly differentiates between questions of principles pertaining to the normative basic structure of the social order and the questions of prudence which can be answered politically in different ways while basically maintaining order. Where to draw the line between questions of principles and prudence may not be decided on clearly in singular cases. But, nevertheless, this distinction is of importance and would benefit the political debate, even beyond the Church’s realm, because it can prevent what today has turned into a really bad habit of public discourse: hyping any political controversy into a conflict of worldviews.

The Basic Principles of Order

Today, in modern social ethics, frequently social justice is named the target value. This has got to do, above all, that the majority of current socio-philosophical contributions to the theory more or less directly center around the concept of a 50-year-old book: John Rawls’ *Theory of Justice* of 1971. Its introductory thesis runs: “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, just like truth with systems of thought.”

⁷ This axiomatic statement deserves question marks because everyday social discourse and especially the history of the theory of political philosophy revolve alone around the question of justice. Justice does play a central role but other social target values like freedom, peace and security are of no less importance and depending on time and place even more important than justice. In the history of political philosophy, the sum of these target values has been subsumed under the notion of good respective common weal.⁸

Nevertheless, the notion of justice also plays an important role in Catholic Social Teaching, but it is grounded in a different concept than Rawls'. Somebody who wants to understand why the Church was well advised to design its Social Teaching as a syntactic structure of open sentences containing a few basic principles can regard Rawls' voluminous work as an example of someone who gets lost in aporias, contradictions and unfounded argumentations when attempting to work out a systematic timeless draft of a just social order.

Catholic Social Teaching has never attempted to unfold an encompassing theory of justice. Instead, justice here is met in more general terms than a social-ethical guiding principle or a regulative idea. Starting point and, at the same time, point of reference is Man who is regarded as an individual with unalienable dignity in all his (her) phases of life. Personality therefore is the first principle of the Church's Social Teaching and even more: the foundation of all principles of order.

When Christian anthropology speaks of man as a person it implies that the exciting being together of the autonomous, self-determined individual who is orientated to being together with other people depends on communication and social intercourse in his or her existence. Human personality thus realizes itself in a permanent interaction of individuality and sociability. This, by itself, is no ethical statement but an observation confirmed by the empirical human sciences in various ways.

As a social-ethical principle, personality means that the design of social order should do justice to this essential person-being of Man. Such an order is not simply "nice to have" but inalienable to secure humane living together of people. Christian anthropology knows about another condition confirmed by many experiences: Man is capable of selflessness but very often is also a selfish egoist; Man is capable of good but also evil. It is the task of social order, in reference to the metaphor of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), to moderate and order social living together of people, carved from crooked wood, in such a manner that life is amicable and peaceful. Social incentives must be installed in such a way that good conduct is furthered and bad behaviour sanctioned. The interests of the individual and the community must be kept in a balance by the order.

It is just such a human specific order that the social-ethical principle of common weal aims at. In the understanding of Catholic Social Teaching common well-being is not a quantitative entity, i.e. does not mean the plain sum of single well-beings. That would be the notion of common well being used by Utilitarianism or Marxism which take as a starting point the possibility of planning calculations to optimize the benefits for society at large. From a person - related perspective, common well-being is rather a qualitative entity orientated to the possibility of personal development within the social order. There is a classical definition for modern Social Teaching from the encyclical *Mater et magistra* (1961): well-being as the "epitome of those social

conditions which facilitate and make possible for people to fully develop their values” (*Mater et magistra* 65). To these belong security at home and abroad of the community, the guarantee of basic civil liberties such as the freedom of expression and basic rights, including social rights. Last but not least stability of the order itself is part of these conditions as only a stable framework of conditions and rules offers reliability and secure planning which the individual needs to be able to make use of his freedom.

In classical social teaching, the two central principles for realizing such an order for the common well-being are subsidiarity and solidarity. As a social-ethical term, the adjective subsidiary has been used since the 19th century. In 1931, it was formulated in detail for the first time as the social principle of subsidiarity in the encyclical *Quadragesimo anno*. There it says: “what the single human being can achieve by exerting his own initiative and power, cannot be withdrawn from him and delegated to the activity of society; it is a violation of justice to take away from smaller and subordinate communities what they can achieve successfully on their own for the use of the larger and higher community; at the same time it is greatly disadvantageous and confuses society’s order as a whole. Any activity by society is in its essence and terminology of a subsidiary nature; it is to support the members of the social politic, but must never smash them or suck them up” (*Quadragesimo anno* 79).

The principle of subsidiarity has two sides, a negative and a positive one. The negative side emphasizes the right of the individuals and social communities to self-determination. It contains a right to fending off unauthorized interference and infringement. This right goes hand in hand with the duty of self-responsibility. Where the resources for this self-responsibility are exhausted there exists however a claim to state development funds and support. That is the positive side of the principle of subsidiarity. This relates to the concept of the subsidiary welfare state which provides aid to self-help contrary to the rudimentary welfare state which offers only an incomplete basal social security but also in contrast to the all-encompassing welfare state which treats its citizens as state wards.

As an ethical ordering principle, the maxim of subsidiarity serves to determine social relations and competences within the social order. But this is not at all about shaping social processes in an efficient manner rather it is the primary goal to maintain the room of freedom for the individual and society at large. This is the personal core content of the principle of subsidiarity.

Whereas the principle of subsidiarity stresses the autonomous self-responsible side of the human being in society, the principle of solidarity focuses on the social side. The classical detailed formulation of solidarity as an ethical ordering principle dates back to Oswald von Nell-Breuning: “The factual state of affairs that the individual’s welfare and the common welfare are interwoven is what we call ‘common interwovenness’; the normative statement that the members and the whole bear mutual responsibility as ‘common *liability*’”.⁹

Solidarity as a social-ethical principle means more than the mere bond due to common interests in the sense of “group solidarity” but relates to the mutual acknowledgement, empathy and support members of a human community owe each other. The starting point is not common interests but the personal dignity attributed to every individual. That is the personal core of the principle of solidarity which, in the

end, relates to humanity at large. All suffering in the world we owe empathetic solidarity. This does not imply a contradiction to the duties of solidarity in the social vicinity being more refined than in a global perspective. Catholic ordering ethics is universalist but not utopian.

As a principle of order, solidarity demands structures and institutions created within the social order that offer systems of recompense and support in solidarity for the individuals' burdens due to the vicissitudes of life. Social order must be organized in such a way that everybody can lead a humane existence free from humiliation and the opportunity of participating in the essential activities of living life.

Whereas classical Catholic Social Teaching regarded, above all, the national state as the practically exclusive political arena of decisions and actions in former times, the agenda today is also on social challenges crossing states and even generations such as, for example, world climate. Pope Francis has dedicated his special attention to this question in his recent social encyclical *Laudato si* (2015). Here again, the character of Social Teaching shows up as a syntactical structure of open sentences which offer room with the view of spelling out new challenges.

In the course of this, the principles of order, too, undergo a conceptual adaptation. Welfare today means the welfare of the world and, in times of globalization, solidarity is not of a moral nature anymore but rather a worldwide commandment of political order. Solidarity with future generations and welfare bridging generations are meanwhile called for by the principle of sustainability which supplements the classical catalogue of principles. And, finally, subsidiarity is not an inner-state principle of order but today is also valid for the relationship of states and larger supranational organisations respectively associations.

Ordering Ethics and Ordering Politics – Example of Europe

Ordering ethics of Catholic Social Teaching is not a mere discipline of theoretical work but serves the goal of becoming practical in the politics of order. The examples listed at the beginning show that the historical perspective often was successful. However, society has changed considerably in the past 50 years. The classical structures of milieu have been eroded. This also applies to the Catholic milieu which once was the societal domain of resonance for the Church's Social Teaching and thus the basis for its political influence. But it would be wrong to assume that because of the loss of this milieu today's social announcements have slackened in their political importance. Especially the papacy provides a moral authority which has been, as ever before, unique in the world. How this authority can be turned into political influence has been aptly demonstrated by Pope Francis in the past years in various impressive ways. On his pastoral journey to Lampedusa in 2013, he influenced the political debate on refugees in Europe, and, by his social encyclical *Laudato si*, which was published in 2015, the policy on climate change. Not a small number of observers share the opinion that the Pope's courageous stepping in for the protection of the climate brought about the difference at the Paris Climate Conference at the end of 2015 thus considerably contributing to the coming about of the far-reaching Paris Agreement's resolution.

The pope from Argentina, who places Europe less in the centre of his pastoral work than did his predecessors, was even awarded the Charlemagne's Prize in 2016

which is conferred for the merits of European unification. This does not only point out the prowess of the Pope's authority but also shows how much the European Union seeks for stability and orientation in its greatest crisis so far. The tragic thing about this crisis lies in the European states and the institutions of the Union being the cause themselves to a greater part. And Europe offers itself as an example of the crisis being rooted in a considerable lack of ordering ethics, orientation and clarity and stringency of political order. This starts off with the notorious disregard of the principle of subsidiarity by the European institutions. EU-guidelines for the authorized degree of cucumbers' curvature or minimal size of apples betray an obsession for regulations which invite a smile, but, in sum have contributed a great deal to the loss of trust and respect for Europe.

A more serious problem is the fact that the EU has failed so far where it should have acted jointly in urgent cases: the European national debts and refugee crises. In its roots, these problems are mostly self-inflicted and, in essence, lie in a failure of the political order. With a view on the common currency, from the beginning the breach of the Maastricht rules was put up with unflinchingly with no consequences by a number of states. When this way of acting adhering to the principle of hope had led to the greatest financial crisis of the states, common rules were further bended to cause no greater disaster. The same applies to the Schengen area. Europe opened its inner borders without consequently realizing the urgently necessary protection of the outer borders, leave alone a common policy of safety and migration. The result was that the union in this case failed and is still failing when faced with the first earnest test of the refugee crisis that began in 2015.

In the financial state crisis, the European Central Bank and its President Marion Draghi prevented the threatening end of the Euro by drastic measures. And in the refugee crisis, Germany and her Chancellor Angela Merkel averted the threat of Schengen's end, practically on their own steam. Part of the tragedy of this story was that this was possible only for the price of breaking common rules. Neither the Euro nor Europe's open borders have been rescued by this action; both crises have not been resolved. But Draghi and Merkel – at no little cost – have bought time to tackle the problems. To have this succeed in time, a swift turning away from “muddling one's way through” and the return to a policy of order with clear rules and their consequent implementation, are of urgent necessity. Ordering ethics, as represented by Catholic Social Teaching, can serve as a moral compass to find one's way back to a good policy of order.

Annotations:

¹Wilhelm E. v. Ketteler, Schriften, Aufsätze und Reden 1867 – 1870 (Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Bd. I/2), Mainz 1978, 438.

² Letztmalig nachgegeben hat die kirchliche Soziallehre dieser Versuchung 1931 in der Enzyklika *Quadragesimo anno*. Papst Pius XI. empfahl hier das korporatistische Modell der „Berufsständischen Ordnung“ als dritten Weg zwischen Kapitalismus und Kommunismus

³ Vgl. Hermann Josef Wallraff, *Katholische Soziallehre – Leitideen der Entwicklung? Eigenart, Wege, Grenzen*, Köln 1975, 26 ff.

⁴ Vgl. Michael Oakeshott, *The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe*, 8. Aufl., New York 1950, XXII, Anm. 1

⁵ Johannes Paul II., Erinnerung und Identität. Gespräche an der Schwelle zwischen zwei Jahrtausenden, Augsburg 2005, 61.

⁶ Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation, in: Ders., Kirche und christlicher Glaube in den Herausforderungen der Zeit. Beiträge zur politisch-theologischen Verfassungsgeschichte 1957-2002, 2. Aufl., Berlin 2007, 213-230, hier 229.

⁷ John Rawls, Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, übers. v. Hermann Vetter, 10. Aufl., Frankfurt a. M. 1998, 19.

⁸ Siehe dazu auch Christoph Horn, Einführung in die Politische Philosophie, Darmstadt 2003, 92 f.

⁹ Oswald von Nell-Breuning, Gerechtigkeit und Freiheit. Grundzüge katholischer Soziallehre, Wien 1980, 47.